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A FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT MAY DESTROY THE CAREER OF A
PROFESSIONAL: IS THERE NO REMEDY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The decade of the 1970's saw an increase of crisis proportions in the
number of medical malpractice claims,1 and this crisis has lingered into
the 1980's. Furthermore, lawyers, architects, engineers, accountants, and
other professionals 2 are becoming increasingly aware that malpractice liti-
gation has not been limited to attacks on health care practitioners.3
1. The medical malpractice crisis has been the subject of numerous books and many arti-
cles. See, e.g., R. COHEN, MALPRACTICE (1979); R. GOTS, THE TRUTH ABOUT MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE (1975); J. GUINTHER, THE MALPRACTImoNERS (1978); J. KING, THE LAW OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE (1977); L. LANDER, DEFECTIVE MEDICINE: RISK, ANGER, AND THE MALPRACTICE
CRISIS (1978); S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE (1978);
THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978); THE INFLUENCE OF LITI-
GATION ON MEDICAL PRACTICE (C. Wood ed. 1977); MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE (T.
Lombardi, Jr., ed. 1978); Balliett, 13 Ways to Protect Yourself Against Malpractice Suits,
20 RESIDENT & STAFF PHYSICIAN 70 (1974); Bernstein, Will No-Fault Insurance End the
Medical Malpractice Crisis?, 1978 Hosp. 40; Calabresi, The Problem of Malpractice: Trying
to Round Out the Circle, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 131 (1977); Gaudineer, Ethics and Malprac-
tice, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 88 (1976); Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence:
An Economic View of Medical Malpractice, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1282 (1977); Note, Com-
parative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141 (1975).
The crisis has sparked the introduction of legislation in all fifty states. See generally A
LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE (D. Warren & R. Merritt eds.
1976); Dunn, Legislative Efforts to Reform Medical Malpractice: Unconstitutional in Prac-
tice?, 8 MEDICOLEGAL NEWS 10 (1980); Ladimer & Solomon, Medical Malpractice Arbitra-
tion: Laws, Programs, Cases, 1977 INS. L.J. 335; Nocas, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 13 FORUM 254 (1977); Schrero, Patient Compensation Funds: Legislative Responses
to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 5 AM. J.L. & MED. 175 (1979); White & McKenna, Con-
stitutionality of Recent Malpractice Legislation, 13 FORUM 312 (1977).
The courts also have recognized a medical malpractice crisis. See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd.
of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Pantone v.
Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d
783 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Mallen, Legal Malpractice: The Legacy of the 1970s, 16 FORUM 119, 119
(1980) (1970's experienced fourfold increase over the 1960's in published appellate decisions
of legal malpractice cases). See also Luciani v. High, 372 So. 2d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (engineer liable to homeowner); Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 41
N.C. App. 661, 255 S.E.2d 580 (1979) (architect sued by contractor for negligent conduct
toward architect's client); PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE (S. Schreiber ed. 1967) (examining
malpractice in several areas, including accounting, architecture, engineering, insurance, and
corporate affairs).
Recognizing that professionals are facing increases in malpractice litigation, the Virginia
Bar Association addressed this issue at its annual winter meeting in January, 1980. See
PROFESSIONAL LIABmrY: LAWYERS, ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS, DOCTORS (Va. State B. & Va. B.
Ass'n eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY].
3. See, e.g., Sawyer v. United States, 465 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Va. 1978); Lyons v. Grether,
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The adverse effects of a malpractice suit on the professional reputation
and practice of a defendant are apparent from the very nature of the law-
suit.4 The angry and injured professional may respond with a countersuit
against an adversary's attorney,5 alleging that the malpractice claim was
groundless. Although such countersuits have been largely unsuccessful,6
there have been some significant recent decisions which held an attorney
liable for bringing a frivolous suit against a physician.7
This comment will discuss the ethical duties and possible civil liability
of a lawyer who brings a non-meritorious suit against a professional' in
the framework of the controversy concerning the proposed Model Rules
of Professional Conduct9 and recent appellate decisions.1"
218 Va. 630, 239 S.E.2d 103 (1977); Little v. Cross, 217 Va. 71, 225 S.E.2d 387 (1976).
Over the past decade, writers have attempted to explain the overwhelming increase in
malpractice claims. "A general increase in consumer litigiousness, heightened expectations
of professional performance, especially from the increasing number of specialists, the imper-
sonality of professional service delivery, a breakdown in professional screening and disci-
pline caused by the rapid growth in numbers of professionals, and zealous malpractice law-
yers are among the cited reasons." REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 46 (R. Blair & S. Rubin
eds. 1980). See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 48 (2d ed. 1981)
("[U]nmeritorious suits... crowd already congested courts.... Suits which are brought
for harassment, vexation, vindication, or to coerce an unwarranted settlement are simply not
a proper use of the judicial system."). Id. at 100. See also GOTS, supra note 1, at 200 (money
given to plaintiff in settlement of non-meritorious claim in order to avoid costs of litigation).
4. National Sur. Co. v. Page, 58 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1932).
5. Malicious prosecution has been the subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., Birnbaum,
Physicians' Counterattack: Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified Medical Mal-
practice Actions, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003 (1977); Greenbaum, Physician Countersuits: A
Cause Without Action, 12 PAc. L.J. 745 (1981); Mallen, Attorney's Liability for Malicious
Prosecution, A Misunderstood Tort, 45 INS. COUNS. J. 407 (1979); Owen, Countersuits
Against Attorneys-A Preface, 33 S.C.L. REV. 313 (1981); Wagner, Screening Medical Mal-
pratice Cases, 16 TRIAL 67 (1980); Note, Liability for Proceeding with Unfounded Litiga-
tion, 33 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Unfounded Litigation]; Note, A Law-
yer's Duty to Reject Groundless Litigation, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1561 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Duty to Reject]; Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A
Historical Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Groundless Litigation].
6. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa), affl'd mem., 590 F.2d 341
(8th Cir. 1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 828 (1979); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981); O'Toole v.
Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 266 S.E.2d 108
(1980). See generally MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 3, § 45; Flowers Malicious Prosecution,
33 S.C.L. REV. 317 (1981).
7. See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Mahaffey v. McMahon,
630 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1982); Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981); Bull v. McCuskey, 96
Nev. 706, 615 P.2d 957 (1980); Peerman v. Sidicane, 605 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
8. The scope of this comment is limited to a discussion of groundless litigation against
professionals and does not include an analysis of all forms of malicious prosecution. See
supra note 5 for a list of articles dealing with malicious prosecution.
9. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL RULES]. Self-regulation within the legal profession will be scrutinized to
analyze its deterrent effect.
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II. Is THERE AN ETHICAL DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM BRINGING A
FRIVOLOUS SUIT?
A. Standards of Conduct Within the Legal Profession
According to the Preamble to the final draft of the proposed Model
Rules, "[a] lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate
purposes and not to harass or intimidate others."' Furthermore, several
disciplinary rules in the current Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity seem to prohibit groundless litigation.12 Nevertheless, since the recog-
nition of the medical malpractice crisis in the early 1970's, all fifty states
have enacted legislation 3 to circumvent the effects that malpractice liti-
gation has had on malpractice insurance rates and the cost of health care.
The aim of this legislation is to screen out frivolous suits. 4 However, the
problem has continued, leading state medical societies to begin proposing
their own legislation "in an effort to cure . . . the 'frivolous lawsuit
disease.' "15
Efforts have been made within the American Bar Association to raise
the standard for the filing of lawsuits. The ABA's Commission on Evalua-
tion of Professional Standards proposed "a 'reasonable basis' standard for
bringing or defending a case"" but "was told that its proposed rule on
the filing of meritorious claims would leave lawyers open to charges of
malicious prosecution."' 7 As a result, the proposed rule was changed in a
revision of the final draft's to "a more liberal 'nonfrivolous' standard in-
stead of the 'reasonable basis' test."' 9
Whether lawyers conform their conduct to the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility or to the proposed Model Rules, institution of a frivolous
lawsuit is clearly prohibited. The disciplinary rules forbid a lawyer's ac-
ceptance or continuance of employment, or the filing of a suit, if the legal
10. See cases cited supra note 7.
11. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, preamble.
12. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
CODE]. The specific disciplinary rules are discussed infra at notes 20-22 and accompanying
text.
13. See cases cited supra note 1, para. 3.
14. Little v. Rosenthal, 376 Mass. 573, 382 N.E.2d 1037 (1978). See also Leonard, Medical
Negligence: Perspective on the Coming Decade, 16 FORUM 403, 414 (1980-81) (purpose of
pretrial screening or review panel is to weed out "spurious claims").
15. Winter, Doctors Aim to Cure 'Frivolous' Lawsuits, 68 A.B.A.J. 660 (1982). The Michi-
gan Medical Society has proposed legislation which "would require a lawyer to post bond
ensuring that a lawsuit... states a cause of action." Hurley, Much Ado About Nothing, 17
DocKET CALL 14, 15 (1982).
16. Winter, supra note 15, at 660. See MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 3.1.
17. Winter, supra note 15, at 660.
18. See MODEL RULES supra note 9, Rule 3.1 (Final Draft as revised through June 30,
1982).
19. Winter, supra note 15, at 660.
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action is intended merely to harass or for malicious purposes.20 In addi-
tion, there are specific rules against handling a legal matter without prep-
aration and competency. 21 The violation of a disciplinary rule constitutes
misconduct which is subject to discipline by the bar.22 Thus, whether a
frivolous suit is filed intentionally or negligently due to inadequate prepa-
20. See MODEL CODE, supra note 12, DR 2-109. Virginia has adopted this section of the
Model Code. See VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImLITY DR 2-109 (1976), re-
printed in VA. Sup. CT. R. 6:11, 216 Va. 1064, 1085-86 (1976). The rule provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not accept employment on behalf of a person if he knows or it is
obvious that such person wishes to:
(1) Bring a legal action, conduct a defense, or assert a position in litigation...
merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person.
(2) Present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law,
unless it can be supported.by good faith argument for an extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law.
Id.
In addition, Virginia has adopted MODEL CODE, supra note 12, DR 2-110(B)(1), (2). See
VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrry DR 2-110(B)(1), (2) (1976), reprinted in VA.
Sup. CT. R. 6:11, 216 Va. 1064, 1086 (1976). The rule provides:
(B) Mandatory withdrawal
A lawyer... shall withdraw from employment, if:
(1) He knows or it is obvious that his client is bringing the legal action, conducting
the defense, or asserting a position in the litigation ... merely for the purpose of
harassing or maliciously injuring any person.
(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation
of a Disciplinary Rule.
Id.
Virginia also has adopted MODEL CODE, supra note 12, DR 7-102(A)(1), (2). See VIRGINIA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmLrrY DR 7-102(A)(1), (2) (1976), reprinted in VA. SuP. CT.
R. 6:11, 216 Va. 1064, 1118 (1976). The rule provides:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not,
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense,. . . when he knows or when it
is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure
another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law,
except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
Id.
21. See MODEL CODE, supra note 12, DR 6-101(A)(1), (2). Virginia has adopted this sec-
tion of the Model Code. See VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmUrrY DR 6-
101(A)(1), (2) (1976), reprinted in VA. SuP. CT. R. 6:11, 216 Va. 1064, 1106 (1976). The rule
provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent
to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.
Id. See also Gaudineer, supra note 1, at 109-10; Duty to Reject, supra note 5, at 1590.
22. See MODEL CODE, supra note 12, DR 1-102 Virginia has adopted this section of the
Model Rules. See VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIIITY DR 1-102(A)(1) (1976),
reprinted in VA. Sup. CT. R. 6:11, 216 Va. 1064, 1065 (1976). The rule provides: (A) A Law-
yer shall not: (1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule. Id. See also Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp.
1376, 1383-84 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
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ration, the lawyer has violated his ethical standards.
B. The Duty to Comply with Ethical Standards
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer
represent his client zealously.23 However, the lawyer's duty is "both to his
client and to the legal system. '24 Thus, he must provide zealous represen-
tation "within the bounds of the law, which includes [compliance with]
Disciplinary Rules .... ',2 A position which is "supported by the law or
... a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
the law' 26 is permissible, but "a lawyer is not justified in asserting a posi-
tion in litigation that is frivolous. '27 Therefore, the duties owed to the
legal profession and to the client encourage a lawyer to "urge any permis-
sible construction of the law favorable to his client, '2 but those duties do
not negate the "concurrent obligation. . . to avoid the infliction of need-
less harm.
29
Consistently, courts have held that a lawyer owes no duty of care to
avoid inflicting harm on an adversary.30 The rationale for this position is
that the presence of such a duty would create an "irreconcilable conflict
of interest" for the lawyer.3" However, this reasoning applies only to the
lawyer's duty as an advocate. Moreover, it does not consider the provi-
sions of the Code which deal with groundless litigation.3 2
The preamble to the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct
includes within a lawyer's various functions the roles of advocate, advisor,
negotiator, intermediary, spokesman, and evaluator.3 Depending on the
particular issue involved, a lawyer may be directed by his ethical stan-
dards to assume the role of evaluator and advise a client not to file a
lawsuit. Although his duty to the legal system may require that an attor-
23. See MODEL CODE, supra note 12, DR 7-101.
24. Id., EC 7-1.
25. Id.
26. Id., EC 7-4.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id., EC 7-10. See also MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 4.4.
30. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (negligence is not
proper standard of liability to adversary); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438
(1980) (attorney liable for malicious prosecution but not for negligence to an adversary);
Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981) (duty to client's adversary could
create conflict of interest); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 266 S.E.2d 108 (1980) (duty to
client's adversary is unacceptable conflict). But cf. Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky.
1981) (while duty of care by plaintiff's attorney is not owed to the defendant in the same
sense as in negligence case, it is relevant in establishing probable cause to bring the action).
See generally Duty to Reject, supra note 5.
31. Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. at -, 312 N.W.2d at 590.
32. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
33. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, preamble.
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ney advise his client not to take legal action, this evaluative function
should not be described as a duty to the adversary.- The lawyer owes a
duty to both the client and the profession"3 to evaluate claims only after
adequate preparation. This duty requires a lawyer to refuse to file a frivo-
lous lawsuit.36
C. Self-Regulation as a Deterrent to Frivolous Lawsuits
By defining law as a profession, lawyers assert that they will regulate
the members of their profession in a meaningful way.37 However, the ef-
fectiveness of self-regulation within the legal profession is uncertain, as
evidenced by "public uneasiness about the ethical conduct of lawyers."38
The preamble to the proposed Model Rules explains the responsibility to
self-govern as follows:
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsi-
bilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure
that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in further-
ance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is re-
sponsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct; a lawyer
must also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these
responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the
public interest which it serves.39
The scheme of self-regulation in the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity includes both informal peer review and formal review before a discipli-
nary agency. 40 One problem with this system is the hesitancy within the
profession to file a complaint against a fellow attorney,"1 coupled with the
inability of a client or onlooker to recognize unethical conduct or incom-
petency. As a result, only a few complaints are filed; and most of those
are generated by dissatisfied clients.42
Another problem with the formal review system is its focus on egre-
34. See supra text accompanying note 31.
35. "The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same: to
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law." MODEL CODE, supra note 12,
EC 7-19.
36. See Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981). See generally Duty to Reject, supra
note 5.
37. Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?,
1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 193 (1974).
38. Id. at 194. The durrent President of the American Bar Association recently stated
that "[i]n a host of studies over the years, the public has shown a lack of trust in the legal
profession." Harrell, Public Education About the Law: An Imperative for the 1980's, 68
A.B.A.J. 1184 (1982).
39. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, preamble.
40. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 37, at 203-04.
41. Id. at 207.
42. Id.
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gious conduct of lawyers rather than on performance standards. 3 In or-
der for the process to be productive, both "the task of monitoring con-
duct and the task of maintaining the quality of judgment"44 should be
involved.' 5 However, the observations of other lawyers made during infor-
mal peer review'" will not generally stimulate higher levels of perform-
ance. Although lawyers do seek the approval of their peers, any "negative
observation"' 7 is likely to be communicated "only [for] extremely poor
performances.141
Thus, except in cases of flagrant misconduct, performance goes essen-
tially unchecked, and there is little incentive for a lawyer to refrain from
filing frivolous lawsuits. Even though he never expects the case to reach a
court docket, a lawyer may look to the possibility of settlement by an
insurance company which is anxious to avoid the costs and inconvenience
of litigation.4 9 The attorney may rationalize his actions by the mandate to
represent his client zealously.50 Thus, until there is a more effective
means of regulating the performance of lawyers, frivolous lawsuits will
continue to be filed against professionals. The only viable remedy availa-
ble through the disciplinary channels is for the injured professional to file
a complaint with the disciplinary agency itself.5 1 This procedure does not
provide monetary compensation to the injured professional, but it may
deter similar future conduct by the attorney against whom the complaint
ii filed.
III. POSSIBLE CIVIL LIAB IITY
A. Liability and the Code of Professional Responsibility
There are numerous legal theories under which a professional who has
successfully defended a malpractice suit has been allowed to recover dam-
43. Id. at 232. See also REGULATING THE PROFESSONS, supra note 3, at 72. In its attempt to
regulate its members "the [legal] profession regulates wrongdoing but not competence....
For the profession as a whole the idea of reviewing and regulating performance is not yet
favored. The profession prefers a review apparatus that will deal with moral deviance
alone." Marks & Cathcart, supra note 37, at 230-31.
44. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 37, at 195.
45. Id. at 194-95.
46. Informal peer review occurs whenever a lawyer performs lawyering functions in the
presence of another lawyer. Id. at 204.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 205.
49. See, e.g., GOTS, supra note 1, at 200 (medical malpractice suit filed by patient with
expectation that insurance company will give him something for nothing). But see Bull v.
McCuskey, 96 Nev. 706, 615 P.2d 957 (1980) (institution of medical malpractice suit to co-
erce nuisance settlement is abuse of process).
50. See MODEL CODE, supra note 12, Canon 7, DR 7-101.
51. See Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978) (successful defendant
can be instrumental in bringing disciplinary proceedings against attorney who brought frivo-
lous suit).
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ages.2 However, no cause of action arises under the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 3 Thus, while the preliminary statement to the Code indi-
cates that the disciplinary rules are mandatory standards of conduct for
lawyers, it declines to set forth standards for civil liability.5 Therefore,
the Code does not recognize liability to an adversary for the attorney's
negligent failure to investigate a claim thoroughly. 5 As a result, non-mer-
itorious claims continue to be filed by lawyers who are either unethical or
incompetent, or who simply do not realize that they are violating any
rules governing professional conduct. Consequently, all fifty state legisla-
tures have become involved in the process of screening frivolous medical
malpractice claims by enacting special statutory measures to deal with
the problem. Although some of the statutes have withstood constitu-
52. See Greenbaum, supra note 5 at 755 (citing malicious prosecution, professional negli-
gence, abuse of process, prima facie tort, invasion of privacy, unprofessional conduct by the
attorney, defamation and intentional infliction of mental distress as possible theories for
recovery). See also Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981); MALLEN &
LEVIT, supra note 3, § 45. See generally Birnbaum, supra note 5; Unfounded Litigation,
supra note 5.
53. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility does not provide a private cause of
action against an attorney. See Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 1085, 266 S.E.2d 108, 112
(1980). However, an injured defendant can make a complaint to the bar. See, e.g., Bickel v.
Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372
N.E.2d 685 (1978); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910
(1978); Martin v. Trevino, 590 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va.
1080, 266 S.E.2d 108 (1980).
54. The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in charac-
ter. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no law-
yer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. Within the framework of fair
trial, the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless of
the nature of their professional activities. The Code makes no attempt to prescribe
either disciplinary procedures or penalties for violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor
does it undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional
conduct.
MODEL CODE, supra note 12, preliminary statement. See also Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp.
at 1383-84.
55. See, e.g., Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978) (no cause of
action unless alleged that attorney acted maliciously or knew that client did); Wong v. Ta-
bor, - Ind. App. -, 422 N.E.2d 1279 (1981) (liability for instituting a weak case would
destroy a lawyer's efficacy as an advocate and would result in the filing of only easy cases).
See also Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978) (refusing to expand
attorney liability to cover filing suit for medical malpractice without reasonable cause). See
also supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
56. In Virginia, notice of a malpractice claim must be sent to a defendant before the claim
is filed, and either party may then request review by a medical malpractice review panel
within 60 days. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2 (Cum. Supp. 1982). If a review is requested,
the opinion of the panel is admissible as evidence, but it is not binding at a subsequent
malpractice trial. Id. § 8.01-581.8. Other states utilize, for example, malpractice screening
panels, patient compensation funds, arbitration panels, and limitations on compensation.
See generally authorities cited supra note 1, para. 2. California requires that the plaintiff
obtain a certificate of merit in medical malpractice cases. Greenbaum, supra note 5, at 758-
60.
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tional attacks,5 7 legislation aimed at curbing medical malpractice claims
has been struck down on constitutional grounds in several instances5 8
While the intent of the statutes is to eliminate frivolous claims,59 de-
serving malpractice claimants may suffer because of the time delay and
costs of complying with statutory requirements. 0 Further, the defendant
must bear the expenses of obtaining counsel and losing time from profes-
sional duties; and may suffer mental anguish even when the claim is
found to be frivolous and is never brought to trial.6 1 Therefore, the statu-
tory safeguards may eliminate some medical malpractice claims; never-
theless, the number of countersuits against attorneys is still rising.62
Moreover, existing statutory protections apply only to claims against
health care professionals, leaving the screening of malpractice claims
against other professionals to the discretion of lawyers.
B. Is There an Adequate Remedy for Frivolous Lawsuits Against
Professionals?
In reality, theories under which injured professionals may recover dam-
ages63 are seldom successful.6 Nevertheless, the injury to a defendant is
very real65 and does not end with questions concerning his professional
ability. The injury is much more extensive and can change his career.
The harm to the defendant in a groundless suit can indeed be very great,
involving considerable time, expense, anguish, embarrassment, damage to
reputation and professional standing, loss of business, increase in insurance
premiums, and sometimes loss of employment. Even if the defendant in the
57. See, e.g., DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Memorial Hosp., 628 F.2d 287 (4th
Cir. 1980) (holding the Virginia state to be constitutional); Butler v. Flint-Goodridge Hosp.,
354 So. 2d 1070 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (holding the Louisiana statute to be constitutional);
Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978) (holding the Maryland statute to
be constitutional); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978)
(holding the Wisconsin statute to be constitutional).
58. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (holding that the entire
New Hampshire medical malpractice statute, which inter alia limited damages recoverable
for non-economic loss, was unconstitutional); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d
190 (1980) (holding provision of statute giving health care arbitration panels original juris-
diction over medical malpractice claims unconstitutional); Arneson v. Olsen, 270 N.W.2d
125 (N.D. 1978) (holding statute unconstitutional because of limitation of recovery and dep-
rivation of right to jury trial); Wright v. Central Du Page Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d
736 (1976) (holding provison of Illinois statute which limited amount of recovery unconsti-
tutional). See generally, White & McKenna, supra note 1.
59. See GoTs, supra note 1, at 205.
60. Leonard, supra note 14, at 414.
61. GoTs, supra note 1, at 200.
62. Owen, supra note 5, at 315. Taub, Malpractice Countersuits: Succeeding at Last?,
1981 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 11 (1981).
63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
64. Greenbaum, supra note 5, at 746-47. See also MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 3, § 45.
65. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 120 (4th ed. 1971).
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groundless suit prevails (and there is always some risk of losing even a
"groundless" action), his victory in the first action alone often cannot fully
remedy many of his losses. It is no wonder, then, that the defendant in a
frivolous suit looks to the courts to give him satisfaction.
Part of the problem lies with the lawyer who often "forgets the awe-
some power under his control that he can at will turn loose upon another
person-whose life may be seriously and irreparably altered as a result
.... "87 Doctors, for example, have been forced to relocate in order to
continue practicing, to switch to an area of medicine which has less risk,
to practice "defensive medicine,' 6 s and even to retire early.69
A substantial minority of jurisdictions follow the English common law
rule requiring arrest of the person, seizure of his property, or some other
"special injury" to sustain a malicious prosecution action. 70 However, the
majority of American jurisdictions do not require an injured professional
to allege "special injury" in a subsequent action for malicious prosecu-
tion.71 Nonetheless, there is a relatively small number of appellate deci-
sions in favor of injured professionals, 72 since courts generally adhere to
the requirements of malice or lack of probable cause s to prevent recovery
from an attorney who has brought a malpractice action in good faith. 4
66. Owen, supra note 5, at 314.
67. Id.
No man sued for malpractice ever wins completely .... You can't know what it's like
to go through such an ordeal-until you do it. One day you're a respected confident
professional man. The next day your ability is being debated in court, with all your
friends and patients looking on-and wondering.
Balliett, supra note 1, at 73.
68. GOTS, supra note 1, at 175.
69. See generally id. at 175-79.
70. "The requirement of special injury, or so-called 'English rule,' traces to the enactment
of the Statute of Marlbridge in 1269." MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 3, § 60 (citing Statute of
Marlbridge, 52 Hen. 3 (1269)). See generally Groundless Litigation, supra note 5.
The "special injury" restriction requires allegation and proof of a special loss or
unusual hardship resulting from the malicious prosecution of the original action, and
"'[s]pecial injury' in this procedural sense excludes the kind of secondary conse-
quences that are a common and often unavoidable burden on defendants in 'all simi-
lar cases,'. . ... "
Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 1084, 266 S.E.2d 108, 111 (1980) (quoting O'Toole v. Frank-
lin, 279 Or. 513, 517, 569 P.2d 561, 563 (1977)).
71. See MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 3, § 60; Unfounded Litigation, supra note 5, at 749-
50.
72. See cases cited supra note 7.
73. See Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895, 900 (Ky. 1981); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich.
1, -, 312 N.W.2d 585, 611 (1981) (Coleman, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See also Unfounded Litigation, supra note 5, at 750.
74. There has, however, been a recent increase in the number of countersuit settlements
by attorneys, Taub, supra note 62, at 20, which indicates that at least some attorneys are
recognizing the real injury which can be caused by frivolous suits against professionals. See
supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
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1. Malicious Prosecution Actions in Virginia
It has been suggested that the most appropriate avenue by which the
injured professional may seek recovery is a malicious prosecution counter-
suit.7 5 However, there are strict requirements for success in such a cause
of action;70 and the Virginia Supreme Court has specifically stated that
malicious prosecution claims are not favored.7 7 The decision which lim-
ited the viability of the action in Virginia was the 1980 case of Ayyildiz v.
Kidd.7
8
In Kidd the Virginia Supreme Court observed:
[A] lawyer is subject to the Disciplinary Rules of this Court, particularly
Rule 6:ll:DR 7-102(A)(1) which forbids him to "[flile suit, assert a position
... or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or it is obvi-
ous that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure an-
other." This rule covers substantially the acts which are the foundation for
an action for malicious prosecution. 9
Nevertheless, the court denied recovery because of the inability of the
plaintiff physician to prove "special injury." The allegations of damages
had included "costs to defend the malpractice action, injury to . . .pro-
fessional reputation and good name, plus the loss of present and future
earnings and profits."8 However, the court ruled that these were ordinary
expenses rather than "special grievance or damage."81
With this decision, Virginia joined the minority 2 of American jurisdic-
tions which require pleading of "special injury" in an action for malicious
prosecution. The Virginia Supreme Court justified its decision with the
reasoning that "there should be no restraint upon the suitor through fear
of liability resulting from failure of his action. Also disputes should not be
tried a second time under the guise of actions for malicious prosecu-
tion."8 3 In adopting this rationale, the court's opinion noted that "Dean
75. Greenbaum, supra note 5, at 746. See also Flowers, supra note 6, at 327.
76. See MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 3, §§ 54-60; Wald, Attorney's Malicious Prosecution
of Client's Action, 30 P.O.F.2d 197 (1982); Duty to Reject, supra note 5, at 1562 n.8.
77. See Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 1082, 266 S.E.2d 108, 110 (1980).
78. 220 Va. 1080, 266 S.E.2d 108.
79. Id. at 1083, 266 S.E.2d at 111.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1084, 266 S.E.2d at 112. If the plaintiff had also alleged mental anguish, embar-
rassment, increased malpractice insurance premiums, loss of time from his practice, and
actual loss of livelihood, he may have improved his chances for success. However, it is ques-
tionable that it is even possible to meet the requirements for special injury in Virginia or in
other jurisdictions following the English rule. See Greenbaum, supra note 5, at 752.
82. 220 Va. at 1083, 266 S.E.2d at 111. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1380
& n.1 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, -, 312 N.W.2d 585, 596 (1981);
O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, -, 569 P.2d 561, 564 & n.3 (1977). See also MALLEN &
LEvrr supra note 3, § 60.
83. 220 Va. at 1083, 266 S.E.2d at 111.
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Prosser considered these reasons of 'questionable validity,' ,,84 and that
the Restatement (Second) of Torts had rejected the English rule.85
In a much earlier case,86 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had rec-
ognized that "the courts should be open and free to all who have griev-
ances and seek remedies. . . and that disputes be not tried a second time
by the courts under the guise of actions for malicious prosecution. 87 De-
spite these considerations the Fourth Circuit held that "the principle
upon which the action for malicious prosecution is grounded. . . requires
that the law afford a remedy for the wrong sustained by one who has been
injured in his person, reputation, property, or business by the institution
of groundless proceedings in the courts."88 Thus, the Fourth Circuit held
that injury to reputation and business is sufficient for special damages.
2. Decisions in Other Jurisdictions
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee handed down one of the first appel-
late decisions 9 awarding damages to a physician in a countersuit against
a former adversary's attorney.90 In the prior malpractice action, the com-
plaint against the physician alleged that he "did not use the care and skill
ordinarily used by physicians in medical practice, and [that he] negli-
gently and incorrectly diagnosed [the patient's] condition ...."I'll The
trial court granted a summary judgment to the physician.9 2 In the physi-
cian's subsequent malicious prosecution action against the attorney, the
record indicated that the attorney had not made an investigation of the
prior malpractice claim 5 The Tennessee court held that "an action may
84. Id. (citing PROSSER, supra note 65, § 120). The Michigan Supreme Court did not ac-
cept Prosser's argument "that the heavy burden of proof which the plaintiff bears in [mali-
cious prosecution] actions will safeguard bona fide litigants and prevent an endless chain of
countersuits." The court decided instead, that if only a few plaintiffs would recover there is
no point in expanding the cause of action. Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. at -, 312
N.W.2d at 601 (quoting PROsSER, supra note 65, § 120).
85. 220 Va. at 1083, 266 S.E.2d at 111 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674
(1977)).
86. National Sur. Co. v. Page, 58 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1932).
87. 58 F.2d at 148.
88. Id. The court specifically stated that "the groundless and malicious institution of even
civil suits will furnish a basis of action where accompanied by arrest of the person, seizure of
property, injury to business, or other special damage." Id. (emphasis added).
89. As recently as 1980, the Virginia Bar Association noted at its annual winter meeting
that "[s]everal [countersuits] have been considered by the appellate courts in other jurisdic-
tions, but the suing physician has never prevailed." PROFESSIONAL LIAaiLrry, supra note 2, at
1-10. See also Taub, supra note 62, at 19.
90. See Peerman v. Sidicane, 605 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
91. Id. at 243. The complaint also alleged that the physician had performed a laboratory
test for the sole purpose of receiving a "kickback." Id.
92. Id. at 244.
93. Id. "He did not take [the physician's] or any other person's deposition. And ... he
apparently made no effort to prove or support the allegations with respect to fee-splitting.
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be maintained against an attorney for ... malicious prosecution and
abuse of process where the attorney's improper actions consist of the in-
stitution and prosecution on behalf of a client of a groundless, spurious
and false claim.
9
'
'
In Raine v. Drasin9 5 the Kentucky Supreme Court awarded compensa-
tory and punitive damages to two physicians for humiliation, mortifica-
tion, and loss of reputation which they suffered as a result of an unsuc-
cessful malpractice case.9 6 The court did not require a showing of special
injury and stated that the "actions of [the attorney] did not comply with
the standard of care for ordinary and prudent lawyers.
97
The Supreme Court of Nevada 8. has allowed a physician to recover
damages against an attorney for abuse of process where the physician al-
leged that the attorney instituted the malpractice suit against him "for
the ulterior purpose of coercing a nuisance settlement." 99 The Nevada
court found that in bringing the prior malpractice suit the attorney did
not examine or obtain medical records, confer with a doctor, or submit
the claim to a screening panel. In addition, he did not take the deposition
of the defendant physician or of any other physician; and he provided no
expert testimony at the trial.10 0 Furthermore, during the trial the attor-
ney made "denigrating comments. . . concerning [the physician]." 10 1 The
court held that the attorney was privileged "to publish defamatory mat-
ter concerning another. . . during the course. . . of a judicial proceeding
in which he participates as counsel, if it had some relation to the proceed-
ing."102 However, the court awarded compensatory and punitive damages
He... did not consult any physician with respect to the standard of medical care in this
community concerning [the prescribed] type of treatment ... " Id. at 245.
94. Id.
95. 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981). In the previous malpractice suit, the two physicians were
charged with negligently breaking a patient's shoulder. However, at the time the doctors
were joined in the complaint, the patient's attorney had already reviewed the hospital
records "which clearly showed that the fracture of the shoulder occurred before [the two
doctors] were involved." Id. at 898. After the doctors had contacted their insurance com-
pany and retained an attorney, the action was voluntarily dismissed against them. Subse-
quently, they filed a malicious prosecution suit against the patient's attorney. Id.
96. Id. at 900.
97. Id. at 901.
98. Bull v. McCuskey, 96 Nev. 706, 615 P.2d 957 (1980). After an 86-year old patient
developed bedsores while under his care, the physician was dismissed and replaced by an-
other doctor. This second doctor informed the patient's nephew that there had been no
malpractice by the previous physician. Nevertheless, the nephew contacted a lawyer who
filed the malpractice suit. Id. at , 615 P.2d at 959.
99. Id. at -- , 615 P.2d at 960.
100. Id. at -, 615 P.2d at 959.
101. Id. at -, 615 P.2d at 961. The attorney had called the physician "incompetent, a
fumble-fingered fellow, a liar, a scoundrel, a damned idiot. He also said, '[ilt will be a cold
day in hell when I let that dum-dum take care of my mother."' Id. at -, 615 P.2d at 959.
102. Id. at - 615 P.2d at 961. "[D]enigrating comments... alone would not supply a
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to the physician on the abuse of process claim.'
In Friedman v. Dozorc, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that an
attorney owed no duty to his adversary and found no special injury to the
physician.10 4 The court concluded that "the demands of the adversary
system distinguish the legal profession from other professions whose
members have been held liable to third parties for negligence, and the
present case from those in which lawyers have been held liable to third
parties. 10 5 The Friedman court did recognize the duty of a lawyer to his
client to conduct a reasonable investigation before filing a suit,0 ' but
would allow no cause of action in negligence to the adversary who was
injured as a result of the negligent investigation. 10 7
The Friedman decision was accompanied by two well-reasoned dissent-
ing opinions.'08 The majority had required proof of special injury "to
limit the circumstances in which an action for malicious prosecution of
civil proceedings can be maintained."' 09 However, one dissent argued that
this "denied free access to the courts for all those who have suffered harm
but no 'special injury' from wrongful litigation."" 0 The dissent reasoned
that a better means of protecting lawyers who have brought legitimate
malpractice claims "would be to look to the other elements of the mali-
cious prosecution cause of action-such as no probable cause and an im-
proper motive . . .,,
basis of liability in damages, [but] it does not follow that an attorney may so conduct him-
self without fear of discipline." Id. at -, 615 P.2d at 962.
103. Id. at -, 615 P.2d at 961.
104. 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981). The original malpractice suit had been filed
almost two years after the death of Dr. Friedman's patient. She had died five days after
surgery from "a rare and uniformly fatal blood disease, the cause and cure of which are
unknown." Id. at -, 312 N.W.2d at 588. The malpractice trial resulted in a directed verdict
for Dr. Friedman at the close of the plaintiff's proof. Id.
105. Id. at -, 312 N.W.2d at 594.
106. See id. at -, 312 N.W.2d at 591.
107. Id. at -, 312 N.W.2d at 591-92.
108. Id. at -' 312 N.W.2d at 610 (Coleman, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at -, 312 N.W.2d at 613 (Moody, J., dissenting in part).
109. Id. at -' 312 N.W.2d at 600.
110. Id. at -, 312 N.W.2d at 613 (Coleman, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis added). In his dissent, Chief Justice Coleman pointed out that "by invoking
the special injury requirement on behalf of meritorious litigants, the meritorious and frivo-
lous claims alike are protected when no special injury can be alleged. Neither is protected
when a special injury allegation might be alleged." Id. at -, 312 N.W.2d at 611 (Coleman,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. Id. at -, 312 N.W.2d at 611 (Coleman, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis in original). Another dissent reasoned "that the elements of lack of proba-
ble cause and malice provide the necessary protection to attorneys and litigants seeking
access to the judicial system, while, at the same time, they allow proper redress for vexa-
tious litigation." Id. at -, 312 N.W.2d at 616 (Moody, J., dissenting in part).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Presently, a competent physician, architect, lawyer or other profes-
sional may be subjected to a frivolous lawsuit which may harm his career,
as well as affect his personal well being. Whether the filing of frivolous
suits results from negligence, incompetence, or malice, it is a form of mal-
practice. 1 2 At the present time, the injured professional has no redress
for this form of malpractice in a substantial minority of jurisdictions if he
is unable to prove "special injury" in an action for malicious prosecution.
In disciplinary proceedings against a member of the bar "a cloak of
secrecy usually remains until the very last stage when punishment is
meted out by the highest court in the jurisdiction."'' 3 This confidentiality
is maintained in order to protect "the lawyer involved against adverse
publicity which might result from groundless charges."" 4 Since there is a
lesser degree of protection afforded other professionals," 5 there appears
to be a double standard allowing special consideration only for lawyers.
This is especially disturbing since the legal profession is charged with the
responsibility of not promulgating its regulations in furtherance of self-
interested concerns."1
6
112. This type of behavior falls below the minimum standards of conduct required by the
Code of Professional Responsibility, see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text, and
would be equivalent to malpractice, which is defined as "[p]rofessional misconduct or unrea-
sonable lack of skill." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that these abuses lower the public's opin-
ion of the judicial process. The court stated:
While we must be careful to assure that the courts are always open to complaining
parties, we have an equal obligation to see that its processes are not abused by
harassing, or by recklessly invoking court action in frivolous causes .... Lawyers
have an obligation as officers of the court not to indulge in ... these practices. Vexa-
tious litigation and the law's delays have brought the courts in low repute in many
instances, and when the responsibility can be fixed, remedial action should be taken.
Gullo v. Hirst, 332 F.2d 178, 179 (4th Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
113. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 37, at 233.
114. Id.
115. The lack of self-restraint among lawyers in filing frivolous claims and the public na-
ture of malpractice trials does not afford other professionals protection from groundless
suits. See supra text accompanying notes'43-49.
116. See supra text accompanying note 39. Other evidence of self-interest in the legal
profession's self-regulation scheme is the lack of lay involvement in disbarment proceedings.
There is no lay involvement in the process [of disbarment proceedings], and none
appears to be contemplated. There is a curious inconsistency here. If decisions about
guilt or innocence can be made by a lay jury in a criminal trial, or about appropriate
compensations in a civil suit, why can a lay group not evaluate evidence concerning a
member of the legal profession's behavior? "Diagnosis" by vote in a jury trial is ap-
parently acceptable, whereas the public is not entrusted to "evalute" by vote in the
matter of an attorney's performance.
REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 3, at 76. Although the lack of lay involvement in
disbarment proceedings is beyond the scope of this comment, it is a relevant issue to raise in
considering the need for effective self-regulation and self-restraint among lawyers.
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In Virginia and the other minority jurisdictions,1 1 the strongest argu-
ment for retaining special injury as an element of malicious prosecution is
preservation of access to the courts. 118 The minority jurisdictions reason
that removing the requirement for special injury will make lawyers afraid
to file malpractice claims which are only tenable."' However, the minor-
ity rationale is not supported by the judicial experience of majority states
which require only that general damages be proven in malicious prosecu-
tion actions. 20 There have been only a few appellate decisions granting
compensation in countersuits against an attorney in majority states,121
which suggests that the requirement of malice, coupled with lack of prob-
able cause, is sufficient to protect "bona fide malpractice claimants."' 2
Competent, ethical lawyers do not need to be concerned about mali-
cious prosecution countersuits. If, after adequate preparation, the lawyer
believes in good faith that his client does have grounds to file a malprac-
tice claim, 23 then he should not be reticent in bringing suit.
Self-restraint within the legal profession would be the ideal solution to
the problem of unfounded litigation. However, since neither self-regula-
tion nor special legislation has solved the problem,1 24 it seems to have
devolved upon the courts to provide an appropriate remedy.
The Virginia Supreme Court recognized that DR 7-102(A)(1) substan-
tially covers "the acts which are the foundation for an action for mali-
cious prosecution.' 1 25 Therefore, "[i]f we are to give substance to DR 7-
102(A) subds. (1) and (2), which establishes an attorney's duty to the
public not to bring frivolous litigation, a viable malicious prosecution ac-
117. See supra text accompanying note 82.
118. See Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, -, 312 N.W.2d 585, 601 (1981); Ayyildiz v.
Kidd, 220 Va. at 1083, 266 S.E.2d at 111.
119. See Berlin v. Nathan, 64 11. App. 3d 940, -, 381 N.E.2d 1365, 1375 (1978). But cf.
Wong v. Tabor, - Ind. App. -, -, 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1288 (1981) (belief that client's
claim is tenable is sufficient for probable cause).
120. See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980). Although it was con-
cerned with preserving access to the judicial system, the court rejected the requirement for
special damages in a malicious prosecution action, which had been the rule in Kansas since
Carbondale Inv. Co. v. Burdick, 67 Kan. 329, 72 P. 781 (1903). See Nelson, 227 Kan. at -,
607 P.2d at 447.
121. See cases cited supra note 7.
122. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977); see also Friedman, 412 Mich. at
-, 312 N.W.2d at 616 (Moody, J., dissenting in part) ("[A]n attorney should be prepared
to represent clients with doubtful, but tenable claims.").
124. "Preliminary screening panels and legislated upper limits for monetary awards may
alleviate some of these problems, but in the final analysis, legal recourse should be reserved
for those cases in which fundamental rights have truly been violated." GOTS, supra note 1,
at 216. Furthermore, the legislation only applies to health care professionals.
125. Ayyildiz, 220 Va. at 1083, 266 S.E.2d at 111. See also supra text accompanying note
79.
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tion is necessary." 128
If Virginia and the other jurisdictions following the English rule con-
tinue to require proof of special injury, they may be wise to redefine "spe-
cial injury" to include the humiliation, mental anguish, embarrassment,
damage to reputation, and loss of livelihood suffered by professionals who
must defend unfounded lawsuits. Where there is proof of malice on the
part of the attorney and lack of probable cause in bringing the suit, to
refuse relief for lack of a "special injury" is to deny the injured profes-
sional a remedy for malicious prosecution.
Alice T. Meadows
126. Friedman, 412 Mich. at -, 312 N.W.2d at 613 (Coleman, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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